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NOTES
A PROPOSAL TO ADOPT THE CONTINENTAL CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR INSANITY DEFENSES
INTRODUCTION
The insanity defense as it presently exists is one of the most contro-
versial issues in the field of criminal law and numerous proposals have
recently emerged in an attempt to inject a new structuralization into
the law of criminal responsibility.' The basic structure of the insanity
defense is a mixture of legal and medical elements. While the law
oriented element implements judicial process in the courts, the medical
element of an insanity defense seeks to aid the court in its determination
of the mental state of the accused. In the past, legalists, as well as those
in the field of psychiatry, have tried in vain to formulate new tests
of criminal responsibility which would accommodate the legal pro-
fession while recognizing the importance of psychiatry in such cases?
As yet an accommodation between the legal and medical professions
through formulation of an "ideal" test of criminal insanity appears im-
possible; for on the one hand is the M'Naghtens test and its modem
variations which exclusively accommodate the legalist, while at the
polar extreme is the Durham4 rule which allows the psychiatrist to pass
judgment on the accused.5
In theory, the purpose of "accommodation" is two-fold: (1) to in-
sure that the province of the court is not usurped in its power of making
final disposition of the ultimate issue,6 while (2) allowing the psy-
1. E.g., Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Krash, The
Durham Rule and Judicial Administration of the Insanity Defense in the District of
Columbia, 70 YALE L.J. 905 (1961); Weihofen, The M'Naghten Rule in its Present
Day Setting, FED. PROBATION 9 (Sept. 1953).
2. E.g., Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843) (M'Naghten rule);
Smith v. United States, 59 App. D.C. 144, 36 F.2d 548, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1929) (irresistible
impulse test); Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (Durham rule
test); People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal Rptr. 77 (1963)
(diminished responsibility test); Fegeur v. United States, 302 F.2d 214 (8th Cir. 1962)
(combination of M'Naghten and irresistible impulse test); MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01.
3. Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
4. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
5. E.g., State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 152 A.2d 50 (1959); See generally de Grazia, The
Distinction of Being Mad, 220 Cm. L. REv. 339 (1955).
6. It has been stated that:
The function of the psychiatrist is not to try to tell jurors what verdict
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chiatrist to testify as to the conclusions he has reached and the com-
plete fact analysis upon which his opinion is based.7 Attempts made
to accommodate both the legal and medical elements in a case involving
the insanity defense have proved unsatisfactory. Unless a change is
soon made, the results of the past and the prospectus for the future is
uninformative psychiatric testimony providing the fact finder merely
rudimentary information upon which to evaluate the criminal responsi-
bility of the accused." This discussion proposes to examine the com-
plexity of accommodation, the significance of psychiatric testimony,
and the need for full disclosure.
HIsTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The evolution of the right to introduce the insanity defense is un-
certain. There are three prevailing theories based on early primitive
law which are conflicting in regards to the requirement of criminal
responsibility. The "strict liability" theory of primitive law whereby
only the actus reus element of the crime was considered in the guilt
of the accused is the first approachY A second viewpoint is the "blood
relationship" theory which advocates strict liability for the crime based
upon feudal honor and kinmenship.' ° Thirdly, and conversely, is the
school of thought which adheres to the ideology that even in early
primitive law the mental aspect of the crime was, as it is today, an
essential element of the offense.11 Thus, as this theory sees it, moral
culpability became an important aspect of legal liability.12
they should render but rather to portray, as fully and completely as possible,
the mental and emotional make-up of the defendant, how his emotional and
intellectual processes work and how they affected his capacity to control
his conduct, both generally and in the specific situation surrounding the
crime charged.
Campbell v. United States, 307 F. 2d 597, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
7. People v. Martin, 87 Cal. App.2d 581, 584, 197 P.2d 379, 380 (1948). The court in this
case held: "[eixpert evidence is really an argument of an expert to the court, and is
valuable only in regard to the proof of the facts and the validity of the reasons
advanced for the conclusions." Id.
8. For an excellent example of the courts dismay over the present state of psychiatric
testimony see Rollerson v. United States, 343 F.2d 269 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Commonwealth
v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 164 A.2d 98 (1960).
9. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARv. L. REv. 315, 317
(1894).
10. Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HAxv. L. REv. 974 (1932).
11. Mueller, Tort, Crime and the Primitive, 46 J. CRIm. L. C. & P. S. 303 (1955).
12. E.g, Holloway v. United States 148 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Ames, Law and
Morals, 22 HAxv. L. Rnv. 97 (1908).
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Although the development of the insanity defense has been clouded
by time, it is a certainty today that in trying any offense requiring
specific intent the mental element must be present in order to convict.
Following this thread of reasoning, most courts logically hold that as
soon as some evidence of mental disorder is introduced by the accused,
the prosecution as part of its case must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt (like any other fact) either (1) that the accused was sane when
he committed the act, or (2) that even if a mental illess existed such
was not the cause of the crime, that cause being the accused's own
free will.'"
CRIME, MENTAL DISEASE, AND CAUSATION
Deciding whether a person has a mental illness is one problem, 14 but
determining if it produced the criminal act is yet another complexity.
In cases dealing with the insanity defense, the fact that a mental disease
exists in the accused does not necessarily mean that criminal responsi-
bility is non-existent. The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment
in dealing with this problem concluded:
There is no a priori reason why every person suffering from any
form of mental abnormality or disease, or from any particular kind
of mental disease, should be treated by the law as not answerable
for any criminal offense which he may commit, and be exempted
from conviction and punishment.15
It is therefore vitally important to an understanding of the significance
of full disclosure by the psychiatrist that one has cognizance of the
problem of law permeating the insanity cases. As succinctly stated in
Carter v. United States:'6
The problem of law in these cases is whether a person who has
committed a specific criminal act-murder, assault, arson, or what
not-was suffering from a mental disease, that is, from a medically
13. E.g., United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 761, (3d Cir. 1961); Tatum v. United
States, 190 F.2d 612, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
14. In McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962), the court held,
"[T]he jury should be told that a mental disease or defect includes any abnormal con-
dition of the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional processes and sub-
stantially impairs behavior controls."
15. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT REPORT No. 99.
16. 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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recognized illness of the mind; whether there was a relationship
between that specific disease and the specific alleged criminal act;
and whether that relationship was such as to justify a reasonable
inference that the accused would not have committed the act if
he had not had the disease.' 7
In disseminating the complexities' 8 created by the introduction of the
insanity defense, the significance and importance which must be at-
tributed to adequate psychiatric testimony becomes evident." Not
only must a jury decide whether the accused's acts constituted the
offense, but also whether he is responsible for such acts. 20 The primary
source of information for the jury in formulating its conclusions re-
garding the defendant's criminal responsibility is the testimony of the
psychiatrist; furthermore, the effectiveness of such testimony hinges on
the psychiatrist's ability to give full disclosure of his findings. It naturally
follows that if the medical expert is not allowed to relate to the fact
finder the complete background information upon which his ultimate
opinion is founded, what should be exclusively a matter of reason in the
jury's fact finding about insanity often becomes a matter of chance.
THE PRESENT LACK OF FuLL DISCLOsuRE By PSYCHIATRISTS
IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Once the significance of the medical expert is recognized in criminal
trials involving the insanity plea, the next crucial consideration is the
weight presently afforded psychiatric testimony. Unfortunately, it is
apparent that the probative value presently placed upon psychiatric
evidence is at an exceedingly low ebb. A typical evaluation of such
testimony, as well as an adequate explanation of what constitutes "full
disclosure", is found in Rollerson v. U.S.,2 where the court laments:
17. Id. at 617.
18. Aside from the difficulties inherent in possibly differing legal and medical defini-
tions of the terms "insanity" or "mental disease or defect," it is apparent that even the
doctors have difficulty in classifying patients whose mental disorder is on the fringe
area which separates the sane from the mentally deranged. See Waelder, Psychiatry and
the Problem of Criminal Responsibility, 101 U. PA. L. Rrv. 378, 384 (1952).
19. Campbell v. United States, 307 F.2d 597, 614 (D.C. Cit. 1962).
20. In Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1957) the court stated:
If a man is "amens (id est) sine mente" in respect to an act to such an
extent that in doing the act he is not a free agent, or not making a choice,
or unknowing of the difference between right and wrong, or not choosing
freely, or not acting freely, he is outside the postulate of the law of
punishment.
21. 343 F.2d 269 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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No one hearing this testimony or reading these records could un-
derstand why either Rollerson or Kimble acted as he did. We
know nothing of their childhood, their emotional structure, the
major events of their lives, their day to day behavior, their per-
sonalities, their own explanations of their behavior. As it stands
the testimony does little to help the jury answer the question
whether either defendant has any abnormal conditions of the mind
which substantially affected his mental or emotional processes or
substantially impaired his behavior controls.22
It is therefore apparent that full disclosure by the psychiatrist is
advocated by the courts, but due to the existing American system of
criminal procedure there has been little, if any, accommodation toward
informative psychiatric testimony.
Past and Present Attitude of the Courts To'ward Full Disclosure.
Traditional rules of evidence, e.g., the "hearsay" rule, are seemingly
in conflict with the ideology of full disclosure of psychiatric findings.
But as a matter of law, courts today are quite liberal in construing
such rules and seek to allow the psychiatrist to admit broad amounts of
evidence relevant to the insanity issue. As a matter of practice, how-
ever, such construction is rarely implemented due to lack of testimony
upon which to make a ruling.
A psychiatrist, if making a proper examination of the patient's case,
will take into consideration all relevant data concerning the accused's
history and present mental state. The sources of such information are
primary as well as secondary. In the case of primary information, such
as training, experience, and knowledge gained from personal observa-
tion, the courts, under this liberal construction, will admit all such
testimony assuming the psychiatrist shows the validity of the tests
utilized.28 In respect to secondary sources, this type of information,
received before trial, may be subject to possible hearsay objection in a
rare instance. However, as in the case of primary information, evi-
dence rules are presently very broad in admitting secondary infor-
mation (i.e., acts of the accused, information from other experts, and
medical records).
22. Id. at 272-273.
23. People v. Modesto, 59 Cal.2d 722, 732, 382 P.2d 33, 39, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225, 227
(1963).
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Acts of the Accused
A major source of secondary information is the physical and mental
condition of the accused. Physical and mental condition includes the
presence of any states of delirium, halucinations, nervous fits, or any
other condition observed by the psychiatrist and can be properly ad-
mitted in evidence over any hearsay objection in order to show the
relevant mental state of the accused at the time of the crime. 4
Secondly, the declarations of the accused as to his own physical and
mental state are admissible to show (1) the basis upon which the ex-
pert supports his opinion concerning the accused's mental state and
(2) facts to be considered by the jury in resolving the ultimate issue of
insanity. It should be noted that if the court in its discretion considers
that such statements by the accused were given with design, such
evidence will be excluded; however, absent this fact, such evidence is
admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule.25 The reason and
policy for allowing the expert to testify to the accused's spontaneous
utterances is succinctly stated by Professor Wigmore:
There is a diminished risk of untrustworthiness, in that the stress
of excitement stills the reflective faculties and makes likely a sin-
cere utterance. There is a necessity, in the sense that on the sub-
jects covered there is no other testimony likely to be as sincere
and free from calculation.26
Thirdly, the accused's assertions pertaining to his own background
and prior facts leading up to the present circumstances, as a basis for
ascertaining symptoms of a mental illness by the psychiatrist, tradi-
tionally have been held inadmissible as part of the expert's testimony.27
Thus, under the normal circumstances, where the psychiatrist has had
his first contact with the accused subsequent to the crime but prior to
the trial, the defendant's declarations as to his history of past symptoms
of mental disturbances is traditionally inadmissible by the expert in giv-
ing his medical findings. However, if the psychiatrist has had the defen-
24. McCoRMCK, EVIDENCE § 227 (1954); 6 WIGMORF, Evidence § 1770 (3d ed. 1940).
25. McCoR~mi, EVIDENCE §§ 265-268 (1954); WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1718 (3d ed.
1942); People v. Butler, 57 Cal. Rptr. 798 (Cal. App. 1967); People v. Darrow, 212 Cal.
167, 298 P. 1 (1931); State v. Orsini, 232 A.2d 907 (Conn. 1967).
26. WIlGMORF, EVIDENCE § 1752 (3d ed. 1942).
27. Shifletr v. State, 38 Ala. App. 662, 93 So.2d 523 (1956), cert. denied 265 Ala.
652, 93 So.2d 526 (1957); People v. Bray, 42 Cal. App. 465, 183 P. 712 (1919); Bennet
v. State, 382 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964).
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dant as a patient in the past, his medical history is admissible.2s Moreover,
the trend in the law today regarding the accused's assertions of his
case history as a basis upon which to support the psychiatrist's opin-
ion is that such evidence is admissible and necessary for the proper
synthesis of a medical conclusion.29
Beyond the spectrum of information the psychiatrist can obtain from
his own knowledge and experience and the declarations of the accused
(upon which the expert may partly base his opinions but such decla-
rations are not to be considered as proof of facts in issue),30 he may
also delve into other sources. It has been held that general background
information from lay observers,3' opinions of other experts,32 and medi-
cal records33 may be utilized by the psychiatrist in arriving at his con-
clusions. Such information is allowed under exceptions to the "hearsay"
rule.
Thus the existing situation is that most jurisdictions in the United
States when confronted by the insanity issue have tried to formulate
rules of evidence whereby the psychiatrist may be fully accommodated
in his testimony on the accused's mental condition. These rules of evi-
dence allow the psychiatrist great latitude in the sources he may use,
both primary and secondary, in reaching his ultimate opinion. But for
a few exceptions, the "hearsay" rule is almost completely relaxed in
order that the opinion given will be highly informative, fully discussed,
and of benefit to the jury in deciding the ultimate issue.
There are three major causes for the failure of the present system:
(1) rules of evidence in many states allowing the psychiatrist to testify
as to the ultimate issue;3 4 (2) the use of hypothetical questions by the
28. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 267 (1954).
29. United States v. Roberts, 62 F.2d 594 (10th Cir. 1932); Fields v. State, 221 Ga.
307, 144 S.E.2d 339 (1965); Perangelo's Case, 277 Mass. 59, 177 N.E. 892 (1931); Roberts
v. Kubik, 129 Neb. 795, 263 N.W. 143 (1953); Orth, Kleifeker & Wallace v. Scott, 173
Okla. 448, 49 P.2d 112 (1935); Maryville v. McConkey, 19 Tenn. App. 520, 90 S.W.2d
951 (1953).
30. Rohnee v. Cross, 121 Cal. App. 667, 9 P.2d 509 (1932); Mutual L. Ins. Co. v.
Davis, 48 Ga. App. 742, 173 S.E. 471 (1934); Kennedy v. Woods, 131 Neb. 217, 267 N.W.
390 (1936); Eagle Picher Lead Co. v. Black, 164 Okla. 67, 22 P.2d 907 (1933).
31. E.g., Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
32. Smith v. United States, 353 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (In this case it was held
that a psychiatrist could affirmatively rely on the opinion of another expert in his
field as to the mental condition of the accused); Fitts v. United States, 328 F.2d 844 (10th
Cir. 1964).
33. Commonwealth v. Harrison, 342 Mass. 279, 173 N.E.2d 87 (1961); WIGMOPR,
EvxDENcE § 1693 (3d ed. 1942).
34. E.g., State v. Paglino, 319 S.W.2d 613 (Mo. 1958).
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defense counsel for the purpose of concealing relevant psychiatric
findings;35 and (3) failure on the part of some psychiatrists to make
adequate examination of the accused.36
The Consequences of Evidence Rules Allowzing Expert Testimiony on
the Ultimate Issue
In a number of jurisdictions, both state3 7 and federal, 8 as well as in
the view of leading commentators," it is solely the province of the
jury and not of the expert to draw inferences or conclusions concern-
ing the ultimate issues. However, a reputable number of jurisdictions
adhere to the rationale that the expert's conclusions concerning the
ultimate issue is yet another element of evidence which the jury must
weigh in making its decision.40 It is in these latter jurisdictions, where
the ultimate issue is admitted in the expert's testimony, that in fact the
ultimate issue is the only testimony given. Thus, assuming a jurisdiction
which follows this type of evidence rule and also the M'Nagbten test
of criminal responsibility,41 the normal question asked the psychiatrist
would be, "Did the accused know the difference between right and
wrong when he committed the act?" or "Is the defendant a psychotic?"
Indeed, under this authority the attorney gears his questions solely to
the test of criminal responsibility with a twofold purpose in mind:
(1) to try to compel the psychiatrist to answer categorically "yes"
35. E.g., Estate of Dolbeer, 149 Cal. 227, 243, 86 P. 695, 702 (1906).
36. There have been some instances in the past where a psychiatrist was allowed to
testify as to his conclusions based solely on the testimony given in court. Cross ex-
amination for the purpose of discrediting the witness is the solution to this problem,
however.
37. E.g., Sanders v. State, 243 Ala. 691, 11 So.2d 740 (1943); George v. State, 148 Ark.
638, 231 S.W. 9 (1921); State v. Campbell, 82 Conn. 671, 74 A. 927 (1910); State v.
Young, 97 NJ. Law 501, 117 A. 713 (1922); Lancaster v. State, 168 Ga. 470, 148 S.E.
139 (1929); Murrell v. State, 137 Tex. Crim. 92, 127 S.W.2d 896 (1939); Dickerson v.
Town of Christianburg, 201 Va. 342, 111 S.E.2d 292 (1959).
38. E.g, Shreve v. United States, 103 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
570 (1939).
39. E.g., McCoRMIcK, EvmEc 25 (1954).
40. E.g., Tongay v. State, 79 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1955); State v. Paglino, 319 S.W.2d 613
(Mo. 1958); Long v. State, 274 P.2d 553 (Okla. Crim. 1954); Commonwealth v. Nasuti,
180 Pa. Super. 279, 119 A.2d 642 (1956); State v. Ring, 54 Wash.2d 250, 339 P.2d 461
(1959).
41. The M'Naghten rule has been followed in most American jurisdictions as an
exclusive test of criminal responsibility: Weihofen, The M'Naghten Rule in Its Present
Day Setting, Fa. PRoBAnoN 8 (Sept. 1953); WmoxN, INsANry As A DrFNsE IN
CaAsNAL LAw 15, 64-68, 109-147 (1933); Leland v. State, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
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or "no" as to the insanity of the accused; and (2) to try to persuade
the jury that the defendant actually is insane by not letting any other
"unfavorable" evidence appear.42
This problem becomes more complex since in many instances a
categorical answer in medical terms cannot be given. In such cases
experts have found great difficulty in drawing a line between the
merely antisocial personality and the diseased mind, the psychotic and
the psychopathic.4 Furthermore, in this type of jurisdiction the com-
plexities mount because traditionally psychiatrists have exhibited some
hesitancy to testify in a legal proceeding.4 In relation to the insanity
defense, this hesitancy is explainable by the fact that the psychiatrist
is not only strapped by legal jargon, i.e., his findings are limited to the
narrow issue of the defendant's capacity to determine legal right and
wrong, but also he is asked to give his opinion as to the accused's moral
culpability instead of solely testifying on his medical findings. As a
result, the psychiatrist's testimony is given little weight and is often
negated by a judge's instructions to the jury characterizing it as "opin-
ion evidence" and therefore "low grade."
Use of Hypothetical Questions by Defense Counsel
In all jurisdictions, regardless of the rules of evidence relating to
testimony on the ultimate issue, there is a uniform method of delineat-
ing "unfavorable" psychiatric evidence. This universally recognized
method, the hypothetical question, is utilized by defense counsel as a
means, in theory, to elicit information from the psychiatrist.46 How-
ever, as is often the case, practice shades theory and the use of hypo-
thetical questions has been abusive. This abuse has been criticized by
numerous courts, 47 commentators, 48  and psychiatrists. 49  The abuse
42. De Grazia, The Distinction of Being Mad, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 339, 347 n. 36 (1955).
43. Waelder, Psychiatry and the Problem of Criminal Responsibility, 101 U. PA. L.
REv. 378, 384 (1952).
44. Under the present system of criminal procedure more than twenty per cent of
psychiatrists, some of whom are the most able men in the profession, refuse all em-
ployment as a partisan witness. Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness,
22 U. Cm. L. REv. 325, 329 (1955).
45. Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 164 A.2d 98 (1960). It is worth
noting that Justice Musmanno in his dissent considered such instructions erroneous due
to the high quality of psychiatrists today and their equally valuable opinions. 401 Pa.
242, Id. at 108.
46. E.g., George v. State, 240 Ala. 632, 200 So. 602 (1941); People v. Black, 367 IMl.
209, 10 N.E.2d 801 (1937); Wessells v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 664, 180 S.E. 419 (1935).
47. Estate of Dolbeer, 149 Cal. 227, 243, 86 P. 695, 702 (1906).
48. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 686 (3d ed. 1940) comments on the abusiveness of the
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stems from misconceptions by both defense counsel and the prosecut-
ing attorney. The misconception harbored by defense counsels was
recognized by Dieden when he stated:
Defense attorneys often fail to appreciate the nature of psychiatric
evidence and the requirement of full disclosure. They sometimes
feel justified in concealing "incriminating" background informa-
tion while at the same time endeavoring to introduce a "favorable"
psychiatric opinion. This effort usually takes the form of a slanted
hypothetical question with its resultant opinion concerning the
condition of a non-existant hypothetical man.50
In Estate of Dolbeer,51 the court by scrutinizing the abuse made of
the hypothetical questions concluded that such interrogations were
always phrased by defense counsel with particularity in order that
only views favorable to the defense would be admitted. Moreover,
most of these hypothetical questions had a shallow basis and disre-
garded overwhelming amounts of countervailing evidence. Because of
this, the court ultimately concluded that hypothetical questions were,
"astutely drawn, and drawn for a purpose and that purpose never is
the presentation of all the evidence. It is never to present the fair and
accurate view, but the purpose always is to frame a question such that
the answer will announce a predetermined result." 52
The relationship of the prosecuting attorney and uninformative psy-
chiatric testimony is also very close:
In the minds of many prosecuting attorneys there exists an exag-
gerated suspicion that psychiatric testimony is offered by the de-
fense primarily as a vehicle for the introduction of otherwise in-
competent material, especially as a method for circumventing the
hearsay and best evidence rules. This often results in numerous
hypothetical question as:
The hypothetical question is theoretically a necessity. But practically its
abuse by clumsy or clever counsel obstructs the truth and brings the law of
Evidence into disrepute with expert witnesses. A modem learned, judge has
said; "The hypothetical question is the most horrific and grotesque wen
upon the fairface of Justice".
49. Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness, 22 U. Car. L. REv. 325, 329
(1955).
50. Dieden, Gasparich, Psychiatric Evidence and Full Disclosure in the Criminal
Trial, 52 CAL. L. Rxv. 543, 545 (1964).
51. Estate of Dolbeer, 149 Cal. 227, 243, 86 P. 695, 702 (1906).
52. Id.
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technical evidentiary objections, sometimes erroneously sustained,
leading to a disruption of the orderly presentation of the evidence,
to confusion, and to a curtailment of essential disclosure."3
By ascertaining the past and present consequences created by the
abusive use of the hypothetical question, it is apparent that such mis-
use has contributed to the failure of the present procedure and of its
primary objective of eliciting full disclosure of psychiatric findings.
By use of this abusive tactic at the trial level, doubtful material is over-
emphasized by the defense, and the question is often long and in-
volved, 54 with the net result being a hypothetical man who has little
resemblence to the accused whose mental condition is in issue.
Failure of Some Psychiatrists to Make an Adequate Examination of the
Accused
In a few isolated cases, the failure of the psychiatrist to perform his
duty has resulted in uninformative testimony. It should be noted, how-
ever, that if the psychiatrist has not made a proper study of the ac-
cused and does not arrive at his opinions logically, then little weight
will be attributed to such testimony.55
Under the normal case, however, qualified psychiatrists are prepared
to relate their medical findings to the jury. Explanations have been
made to show that the courts are most willing to entertain full dis-
closure by the psychiatrist; furthermore, explanation has also shown
that under the present procedure psychiatric testimony has had lim-
ited probative value. There have been several proposals to accommodate
the medical profession, one of which merits discussion.
BoK's PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH AN EXPERT BOARD
In Commonwealth v. Woodhouse,"6 Curtis Bok, an associate justice
on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, sought in his dissenting opinion
53. Dieden, Gasparich, Psychiatric Evidence and Full Disclosure In the Criminal
Trial, 52 CAL. L. Rav. 543, 545-46 (1964).
54. Guardianship of Jacobsen, 30 Cal.2d 312, 182 P.2d 537 (1947). (Forty page hypo-
thetical question); Treadwell v. Nickel, 194 Cal. 243, 228 P. 25 (1924) (hypothetical
question eighty-three pages long with a fourteen page objection thereto).
55. The court held in United States v. Amburgey, 189 F. Supp. 687, 695-96 (D.D.C.
1960) that, ". . if the trier believes they [the experts' opinions] are logically arrived
at, they are accepted; if not, they are rejected. It's precisely because the conclusions
of the expert's must be weighed in this fashion that it is necessary to probe their
basis."
56. 401 Pa. 242, 164 A.2d 98 (1960).
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partially to accommodate the psychiatric profession. 57 This proposal
as expounded by Justice Bok advocated an abolishment of the state's
test of criminal responsibility. The crux of the proposal, however, is
the separation of the "judicial and the penological processes." 5s By this
separation, the sole responsibility of the court would be to decide
whether or not the accused committed the criminal act. The case would
then move to an administrative board of experts, including psychiatrists,
which would decide whether to hospitalize or punish the accused based
on adequate information. This expert board would also maintain the
responsibility of deciding when, if ever, the defendant would be ready
for release. 9
Although this theory has a few valuable points (such as allowing
the expert's opinion to be given considerable weight), it answers the
problem of accommodating both the court and the psychiatric pro-
fession by actually avoiding it. Unlike governmental safe-guards, a
separation of powers in this case would result in a denial of jury trial
on one of the most important issues of the case, i.e., the criminal re-
sponsibility of the accused. This theory adheres to the ideology that
the jury is not competent in most instances to decide legal irresponsi-
bility. While separation of court and expert would effectuate a com-
plete change in the present system, accommodation requires only a
working within the existing procedure. Such a deviation from tradi-
tional rules of criminal law and procedure as Bok's theory advocates
is much more radical than necessary. It is the province of the court to
decide the fate of the defendant while the expert merely aids in this
decision.
A POSSIBLE SOLUTION FOUND IN THE CONTINENTAL CODES
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Because of the fragmentation of the German court system by Hitler
over three decades ago, the restructuralization of the German Code of
Criminal Procedure was not completed until early in 1950.0 In this
German code is found a possible solution to the accommodation of
both the courts and the psychiatrist in a criminal proceeding. Article
69 of the German Code of Criminal Procedure states:
57. id. at 109 (dissenting opinion).
58. Id. at 110.
59. Id.
60. 10 Tim AmvmCAN SERIEs OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES, 1-23 (1965).
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I. The witness shall be caused to give a narrative account of what
he knows about the subject matter of his examination. The sub-
ject matter of the investigation and the person of the accused, if
such an accused exists, shall be pointed out to the witness before
his examination. 1
The procedural code of France, is very similar to the German Code
in that it also allows an uninterrupted narrative account to be given
by the expert on his findings.62
In implementing this type of procedure in the American system, full
disclosure by the psychiatrist will result. Furthermore, in allowing the
expert to testify fully and freely in terms of his own medical discipline,
the jury will be given much more than merely rudimentary informa-
tion upon which to base their ultimate decision. A somewhat similar
departure from the general rules concerning the introduction of expert
evidence has been adopted in New York."
Rule 4515 of New York's C.P.L.R. is the new rule dealing with ex-
pert opinion:
Unless a court orders otherwise, questions calling for the opinion
of an expert witness need not be hypothetical in form, and the
witness may state his opinion and reasons without first specifying
the data upon which it is based. Upon cross-examination, he may
be required to specify the data and other criteria supporting the
opinion. 4
The purpose of this new rule, as found in the practice commentary,
is to "permit the expert to state what he knows in a natural way, leav-
ing to the adversary the opportunity on cross examination to discredit
him." 65 This rule also seeks to eliminate the evils of the hypothetical
question, i.e., its slanted nature as well as undue length and complexity.68
However, while this new rule seeks to suppress such distortions, it
still allows the utilization of the hypothetical question by both coun-
sels. The problem found in the New York rule is a failure to confront
squarely the issue of accommodation. Unlike the New York evidence
rule, the present proposal tends to go even further because it seeks the
61. Id. at 48.
62. 7 ThE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES, 116 (1964).
63. N.Y. R. Civ. PRAc. 4515.
64. id.
65. N.Y.R. Cry. Pmc. 4515 (commentary thereto).
66. Id.
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abolition of hypothetical questions during direct testimony. By con-
fronting the problem in this manner, by eliminating tactics and strategy
on direct examination, there will evolve a place in the trial where the
psychiatrist will be given the chance to relate all of his findings to the
the jury. This procedure, if implemented correctly at the trial court
level, will allow full disclosure and will not leave to chance a decision
which should be based on well-founded reasoning.
It should be recognized that while the accommodation of both the
legalist and the psychiatrist will be attained by the utilization of this
new procedure, there are possible dangers in this method which may be
encountered.
Testimony on the Ultimate Issue
As aforementioned, there are numerous jurisdictions which apply the
exclusionary rule relating to testimony on the ultimate issue. Under
the present proposal there is a good possibility that in the psychiatrist's
narrative account some testimony will be concentrated on the accused's
ability or disability to frame the necessary intent required to commit
the crime. However, it is in insanity cases where the expert's opinion
is most needed for the benefit of a jury uneducated in such complex
matters. Thus the adoption of the present proposal by these jurisdic-
tions will also require the ratification of the view that the expert's con-
clusions concerning the ultimate issue is yet another element which
the jury must weigh in making its decision.7
Responsibility of the Court
As previously discussed, courts have recently sought greater dis-
closure by the psychiatrist; however, while this procedure will allow
more informative expert testimony, the courts necessarily will have to
assume greater responsibilities.
In some cases there will be a lack of medical testimony on the ulti-
mate issue of criminal responsibility. As previously recognized, many
psychiatrists hesitate to draw conclusions as to the defendant's capacity
to determine legal right and wrong. In such a situation it will be the
responsibility of the trial judge, in his charge, to relate to the jury the
67. E.g, Tongay v. State, 79 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1955); State v. Paglino, 319 S.W.2d 613
(Mo. 1958); Long v. State, 274 P.2d 553 (Okla. Crim. 1954); Commonwealth v. Nasuti,
180 Pa. Super. 279, 119 A.2d 642 (1956); State v. Ring, 54 Wash. 2d 250, 339 P.2d 461
(1958).
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medical findings on both sides in conjunction with the legal test of
insanity in that jurisdiction. The charge to the jury in substance must
inform the fact finder that some medical illnesses of the mind, such as
anti-social behavior, are not considered as legal diseases; 8 furthermore,
assuming the experts differ in medical opinion such that only the de-
fense contends that a legal disease exists, then the jury must be told
to decide the credibility of each expert and his medical findings and
determine whether in actuality a legal disease of the mind is existent.
The responsibilities delegated to the court by adoption of this rule
must be properly assumed, for this is the pivotal point of success or
failure of this proposed rule.
Irrelevant Material
Since the psychiatrist on direct testimony will be unrestricted, ir-
relevant material may be presented to the jury. Because criminal pro-
cedure is wedded to the concept of an adversary system, one concession
should be rendered for the benefit of opposing counsel. This conces-
sion, although the proposed procedure seeks a full and uninterrupted
medical testimony, is to allow objection by opposing counsel in the
instance where the psychiatrist's testimony is no longer medical in na-
ture but rather is highly prejudicial to the opposition's case. Further-
more, since many psychiatrists are partisan witnesses, the medical evi-
dence thus presented may be biased. Cross examination, however, is
the device which will curb any such abuse. Since it is a general rule
that liberal cross examination is permitted not only to probe the basis
of the psychiatrist's findings 9 but also to confront the witness with
countervailing medical authority, 7° the solution to this problem is evi-
dent.
CONCLUSION
As previously shown, it is obvious that psychiatric testimony is an
important element in a criminal proceeding involving the insanity de-
fense. With the ultimate design of heightening the effectiveness of
judicial determinations in criminal cases, the present proposal should be
68. While psychosis is considered a legal disease, an and-social personality, which is
recognized as a mental illness, has been rejected by the courts as a legal illness.
69. People v. Feldman, 299 N. Y. 153, 85 N. E. 2d 913 (1949); Greenwood v. State,
51 Okla. Crim. 74, 299 P. 248 (1931).
70. E.g, Seay v. State, 207 Ala. 453, 93 So. 403 (1922); State v. Hunter, 183 Wash.
143, 48 P.2d 262 (1935).
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adopted since it allows psychiatrists, in terms of their own medical
discipline, to relate their findings to the jury in an uninterrupted nar-
rative account. This procedure, if adopted, would have a few adverse
consequences while far more advantages would result. The possible
disadvantages to this rule have been discussed as well as the methods
for curbing any abuse. However, the foremost advantage of this rule
in regard to psychiatrists would be to encourage more participation
by them in criminal proceedings. Secondly, by allowing full psychiatric
testimony on the mental state of the accused, the quality and quantity
of medical evidence, upon which the ultimate decision will be based,
would be enlarged considerably. This fact, combined with the inclusion
of more able psychiatrists who are encouraged to testify as to their med-
ical findings under this new procedure, will provide the basis for a better
determination of criminal responsibility.
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